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ABSTRACT
This paper makes two contributions to the carbon-sequestration literature. The
first is the development of a theoretical framework within which sequestration and permit
trading may be analyzed jointly in the context of a competitive fringe model. The second
is a numerical analysis of the model. We find that when the cost-structure changes lead to
progressively less separation in costs between the competitive fringe and the polluters (as
well as between the polluters themselves), and the dominant firm becomes progressively
more low-cost relative to the competitive fringe and the polluters, the equilibrium
allocations of sequestration and abatement align with a higher carbon price. Aggregate
output from the competitive fringe decreases smoothly and asymptotically toward zero.
However, the (implied) number of fringe firms fluctuates up and down, eventually
reaching zero itself. This type of result demonstrates the importance of incorporating into
empirical supply-side models demand-side information that is reflective of an underlying
market structure.
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Carbon Sequestration and Permit Trading on the Competitive Fringe

Abstract
This paper makes two contributions to the carbon-sequestration literature. The first is the
development of a theoretical framework within which sequestration and permit trading
may be analyzed jointly in the context of a competitive fringe model. The second is a
numerical analysis of the model. We find that when the cost-structure changes lead to
progressively less separation in costs between the competitive fringe and the polluters (as
well as between the polluters themselves), and the dominant firm becomes progressively
more low-cost r~lative to the competitive fringe and the polluters, the equilibrium
allocations of sequestration and abatement align with a higher carbon price. Aggregate
output from the competitive fringe decreases smoothly and asymptotically toward zero.
However, the (implied) number of fringe firms fluctuates up and down, eventually
reaching zero itself. This type of result demonstrates the importance of incorporating into
empirical supply-side models demand-side information that is reflective of an underlying
market structure.

1. Introd uction

The main focus of carbon sequestration research has thus far been the empirical
estimation of supply functions, both for specific countries and globally. I Although the
I

supply estimates themselves vary, the general opinion emerging from this literature is
that scope exists for cost-effective policies fostering both the curtailment of deforestation
and promotion of reforestation in support of carbon sequestration at national, regional,
and international levels. What has not yet been considered in this analysis, however, is
the role that market structure, or market power, might play in the determination of an
equilibrium sequestration allocation and associated carbon price. This paper is a first
attempt at chara~terizing the role of market structure in the context of a carbon
sequestration model that also incorporates permit trading, and is thus in keeping with
multi-instrument approaches promulgated in international agreements such as the Kyoto
Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998).
A similar issue was faced roughly 20 years ago with respect to permit trading, when
Hahn's (1984) seminal article demonstrated the importance of market power in
determining an equilibrium outcome. Hahn's principle result was that if a single firm
with market power purchases( sells) permits in an otherwise competitive market it will
behave as a monopsonist(monopolist). Thus, the degree of market inefficiency is
systematically related to the initial distribution of the permits. Since then, research has
attempted to quantify the extent to which monopoly and monopsony power influence the

I With respect to country-specific studies, see Stavins (1999) and Lubowski, et al. (2006) for the US, Xu
(1995) for China, Fearnside (1995) for Brazil, Ravindranath and Somashekhar (1995) for India, de long, et
al. (2000) for Mexico, and Sedjo (1999) for Argentina. See Benitez, et al. (2007) and Sohngen and Sedjo
(2004) for estimates of global supply.
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permit-trading equilibrium, most notably in the field of experimental economics using
auction-type environments. 2
Contrary to these earlier works, which assume the existence of monopoly and
monopsony power, we develop a competitive fringe model that reflects the most likely
structure that will emerge in a global market (or series of regional markets) for carbon
sequestration in the presence of permit trading. Our presumption that a competitive fringe
will emerge in the sequestration market is premised on two strands of the sequestration

literature. The first strand is empirical, the second theoretical.
With respect to the empirical literature, Benitez, et al. (2007) estimate global
sequestration supply curves for afforestation and reforestation activities based on highly
disaggregated (grid-level) physical data with country-level controls for political,
financial, and economic risks. They find that low-cost sequestration sites are mainly
located in regions of the developing world, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, southeastern
Brazil, and Southeast Asia. 3 This suggests inter alia that national-level findings, most
notably those ofStavins (1999) and Lubowski, et al. (2006), must be tempered by the fact
that domestic sequestration policies are likely to co-exist, be supplemented by, or be preempted by international or regional agreements to combat climate change. As a result of
comparative advantages, such as those identified by Benitez, et al. (2007), the
equilibrium that emerges in a regional or global sequestration may be governed more by
the interplay of a dominant firm (or nation or region) and a competitive fringe than by
perfect competition within a given nation.

See Muller, et al. (2002) and Godby (2000) for examples of this strand ofthe experimental literature.
Sohngen and Sedjo's (2004) numerical analysis of global sequestration potential is not as sanguine about
the extent of these regional comparative advantages.
2

3

3

It is of course possible that on a global scale the market for sequestration could

resemble more an oligopoly than a competitive fringe. However, as Asheim, et al. (2006)
point out, there are fairly general conditions under which multiple regional agreements
I

(that internalize global externalities such as climate change) outperform a single global
agreement. In particular, the authors find that a regime with two agreements can Pareto
dominate a regime based on a single global treaty, implying that regional cooperation
might be a good alternative - or supplement - to a global environmental agreement. In a
world governed by such regional agreements oligopolies are less likely to form.
Consider, for example, a regional agreement between the US and Brazil. Brazil, for
its part, could

p~tentially

act as a dominant firm due to its relatively low marginal costs

of sequestration (associated with existing reforestation opportunities on vast tracts of
public land (Benitez, et aI., 2007)). US farmers would in turn act as a competitive fringe
due to their relatively high marginal costs of sequestration (associated with existing
opportunity costs for alternative private land uses (Lubowski, et aI., 2006)). International
trading in sequestered carbon would complement an existing domestic permit-trading
market in the US that includes the nation's largest industrial polluters.
In this paper, we develop a simple theoretical framework of a competitive
sequestration fringe in conjunction with a permit trading market (for abatement by
polluters). We then demonstrate through numerical analysis the responsiveness of
equilibrium sequestration and abatement to changes in the relative cost structures of the
three agents included in the model - a dominant sequestration firm, competitive fringe
firms, and polluters·who participate in a permit trading market. We find that when the
cost-structure changes lead to progressively less separation in costs between the
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competitive fringe and the polluters (as well as between the polluters themselves), and the
dominant firm becomes progressively more low-cost relative to the competitive fringe
and the polluters, the equilibrium allocations of sequestration and abatement align wi!h a
higher carbon price. Aggregate output from the competitive fringe decreases smoothly
and asymptotically toward zero. However, the (implied) number of fringe firms
fluctuates up and down, eventually reaching zero itself.
We begin our analysis in Section 2 with a simple graphical exposition of the
competitive fringe model in the presence of permit trading. Section 3 provides a more
rigorous mathematical framework and presents a simple numerical model, which is then
solved for an ini,tial set of parameter values and for subsequent changes in the relative
cost structures embodied by these parameters. The results of the numerical analysis are
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.

2. A Simple Graphical Analysis
This section presents a simple graphical analysis of sequestration and permit trading in
the context of a competitive fringe model. As a point of departure, consider the standard
textbook model of the competitive fringe depicted in Figure 1. 4
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
In this figure, residual demand for the dominant firm's output, IJ, is the horizontal
difference between market demand, D, and the aggregate supply of the (competitive)
fringe firms, sf = Me! (the kink in IJ occurs precisely at the vertical intercept of sf). The
dominant firm maXImizes profit at point d, by setting a price of p * and selling q: units

4

This particular model is adopted from Carlton and Perloff (2004).

5

(where MK intersects Mer). The competitive fringe therefore producesq; at point/and
market equilibrium occurs at point e, with price p* and total quantity Q* =

q; + q; .

Incorporating permit trading into this model (for ease of exposition only two polluters
cum traders are needed) adds corresponding kinks to the dominant firm's residual
demand curve. The model is depicted in Figure 2.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
In Figure 2, the Dr curve has kinks at prices pf(the vertical intercept of the
competitive fringe's aggregate supply curve S) and PI (the vertical intercept of polluter

pi's permit supply curve ~l). Here, the dominant firm maximizes profit at point e by
setting a price of p * and selling q; units of sequestered carbon. The competitive fringe
therefore produces

q; of sequestration at point d and polluter p1 offers q;l abatement

credits for sale at point/(via abatement beyond its statutorily required amount). Because
the equilibrium price p * lies beneath the vertical intercept of its permit supply curve,
polluter p2 chooses not to supply a positive amount of abatement credits to the market. 5
Market equilibrium occurs at point g, with price p * and total quantity sequestered

Figure 2 brings to light a complication in the sequestration/permit trading model that
is absent from the basic model depicted in Figure 1. In Figure 1, closure (via equating
market demand and supply) is not really an issue. This is because the demand and supply

5 Note that the vertical intercept of Dr occurs at price Pb which in tum is the vertical intercept of polluter
p2's permit supply curve ::/2. The coincidence of these two vertical intercepts is consistent with the fact that
for carbon prices above P2 polluter p2 also becomes a net supplier of abatement credits. With both
polluters pi and p2 now being net suppliers, market demand for sequestration is effectively negative, i.e.,
for prices above P2 the U curve extends into the second quadrant of the Cartesian coordinate system.

6

sides of the market are separate, i.e., those demanding the good are not also supplying it,
and vice versa. This is not the case in the sequestration/permit trading model.
Recall from Figure 2 that polluter pi is a net supplier of abatement credits, and

b~th

the competitive fringe and dominant firm are also suppliers of credits (in the form of
sequestration). Because it is explicitly included in the model, polluter p2 must therefore
consume the total amount of credits produced for sale, Q*. This explains the positioning
of polluter p2's permit supply curve. The equilibrium price p* is consistent with polluter

p2 effectively supplying a negative amount of abatement credits for sale (i.e., demanding
a positive number of credits). In specific, polluter p2's demand for credits must equal the
total amount of ~redits offered for sale by the dominant firm, the competitive fringe, and
polluter pi, i.e., Q*.
To provide a more rigorous assessment of the competitive fringe/permit trading
model, in particular with respect to its comparative static properties, we now turn to
theoretical and numerical analyses based on a full accounting of the model's components.
In particular, we explicitly close the model with a market-clearing condition that is
premised on statutorily required abatement levels for each polluter.

3. Theoretical and Numerical Models
As indicated in Section 2, the competitive fringe model of carbon sequestration and
permit trading has three different types of agents/industries: (i) a dominant firm, (ii) a
permit-trading market comprised of polluting firms, and (iii) a competitive fringe. We
begin this section with a general analytical treatment of sequestration and permit trading,
which then guides the development of a simple numerical model to assess the

7

responsiveness of sequestration and abatement to changes in the relative cost structures of
the three agents/industries.
To begin, the dominant firm chooses its quantity of carbon sequestration, qd, to
the profit-maximization problem,
Max qd 1rd = P ( q d ' q; , q~ ) qd

s~lve

6

- Cd ( qd ) - Fd

where p is the per-unit price of sequestered carbon (also, in equilibrium, the price of a
carbon permit),

q;

is the vector

(q;1 ,....,q;1 ) of (profit-maximized) net supplies of

abatement credits produced by the i = 1, .... ,1 polluting firms participating in the permit

>
market (q;i -fJ for all i), q~ =

<

I

. q~ is the total (profit-maximized) supply of

)

sequestered carbon produced by the} = 1, .... ,J competitive fringe firms ( q ~ 2 0 for all}),
Cd

is the dominant firm's sequestration (total) cost function

(C~

> 0, c; > 0), and Fd is a

one-time licensing fee verifying the transferability of the dominant firm's sequestered
carbon. 7 Further, Pqd ,pqp. ,and PqJ• are each assumed negative.

8

The Kuhn-Tucker optimality condition for this problem is,

which results in the dominant firm ' s implicit supply of carbon sequestration,
(1)

6 Variables preceding the parentheses are functions of the variables included within the parentheses. The /
and II superscripts represent the first and second partial derivatives, respectively, of the sole variable
included in the functiop., and a subscripted variable indicates a partial derivative with respect to the variable
in the subscript.
7 We assume a long-run equilibrium is established in the model. Accordingly, fixed costs of sequestration
and abatement do not exist. The one-time licensing fee, F d , is therefore assumed independent of the
dominant firm ' s scale.
S As a result of these curvature conditions on Cd and p , the dominant firm ' s problem is concave.
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and, for future reference, partially determines the equilibrium price of sequestered
carbon,p*.
In the permit trading market, polluter i chooses its quantity of abatement, qpi., to solve
,
the following cost minimization problem,

where Cpi is polluter i's abatement cost function

(C~i >

statutorily required abatement level, and Qp = Li?fPi

O,C;i > 0), ?fpi is polluter i's
.9

Note that polluter itakesp* as

given in this problem.
The Kuhn,:Tucker optimality conditions for this problem are,

which result in the polluters' implicit abatement functions,

and implicitly defines the corresponding net abatement supply functions,
- ) ~.
. 1
qpi* = qpi (P * ,qpi
= qpi -qpi'
1 =

I

(2)

J •••• J .

Polluters with q;i > 0 ( q;i < 0) are net suppliers (buyers) of abatement. For future

reference, let

Q; = Li q;i -> 0 refer to aggregate net abatement supply.
<

With respect to the competitive fringe, firm j chooses its quantity of carbon
sequestration, fJJJ, to solve the profit-maximization problem,

9 The curvature conditions on Cpi ensure that the polluting firm's problem is concave. Note that this
problem can equivalently be expressed in terms ofthe polluting firm's choice of emissions rather than
abatement level. We have chosen the latter merely for expositional and numerical modeling convenience.
Also for convenience, we assume that verifying the transferability ofthe polluters' abatement is costless.

9

Max qjj Jl"jj

where

Cjj

= p *qjj - c jj (qjj ) - Fjj' } = l , ... .,J

is fringe firmj's sequestration cost function

(c~

> 0, c~ > 0), and (similar to the

dominant firm) Fjj is a one-time licensing fee verifying the transferability of fringe firm

j's sequestered carbon .. lD As in polluter i's cost minimization problem, fringe firm} takes
p as gIven.

The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for this problem are,
C~()2 p * ,} = l , .... ,J

which result in the fringe firms' implicit sequestration supply functions,

q~j

(3)

=qjj(p*)20,}=l, .... ,J.

In long-run equilibrium the zero-profit condition for fringe firms}, Jl"~ = 0, detennines
the number of firms in the fringe,
n ~ = nf

(p * ,F f ) 2

°

(4)

where Ff = (F1, .... ,FJ) is the vector of fringe firms ' licensing fees.
Finally, a market clearing condition closes the model,

Qp ~ q~ +q; +Q; = Q*.

(5)

Equation (5) states that aggregate sequestration from the dominant firm and the fringe
firms, q; + q ~ , coupled with aggregate abatement from the polluting firms,

Q;,must be

no less than aggregate statutorily required abatement, Q p • Equations (1) - (5) form a
system of I + J + 3 equations that can be used to solve for the I + J + 3 equilibrium

)0

The curvature conditions on

Cjj

ensure that the fringe firm ' s problem is concave.
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variables

(p*, q;, n~· , q~, q;i ) ' i = 1, .. ..,1 and) = 1, ... .,J.

profit level for the dominant firm,

In addition, a corresponding

Jr; ~ 0 , can be calculated.

For the numerical analysis of this model we first assume, as in Section 2, the
existence of two polluters,p1 andp2, and an endogenously determined number of
competitive fringe firms, which in tum determine an aggregate fringe supply. 11 For
simplicity, we use the zero-profit condition to implicitly determine the number of fringe
firms in long-run equilibrium. This is accomplished by first aggregating the firms '
marginal costs into an industry-level equivalent and then using the industry-level zeroprofit condition
to endogenize Ff =
_

I .F
}

jj •

As a result, the zero-profit condition holds at

the industry level and Ff serves as an implicit proxy for the actual number of fringe firms
in long-run equilibrium, i.e., a larger value of Ff implies a largern~ , all else equal. Also
for simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that Fd = vFj, where v>O is a
proportionality factor, i.e., the dominant firm's licensing fee is proportionate to the
competitive fringe ' s.
Cost functions for the dominant firm, the competitive fringe, and the polluters are
each assumed quadratic. 12 Specifically,

The numerical simulations are performed using GAMS, version 2.0.13.
This functional form is consistent with both Lubowski, et al. (2006) and Benitez, et al. (2007).
Lubowski, et al. (2006) estimate a logistic aggregate supply (marginal cost) function , to which the linear
marginal cost function of the quadratic specification provides a fairly close approximation. Our linear
marginal cost function also approximates quite closely the quadratic function estimated in Benitez, et al.
(2007) over the majority of the range of carbon sequestration considered in that study.
II

12

11

where cost parameters ad, afi api, and jJpi and output elasticities cd and C! are each greater
than zero, i = 1,2 (the remaining variables were previously defined above). It is
important to note that api is not the vertical intercept of polluter i' s abatement-credit
supply curve, e.g., it is not equal to Pi (from McP i = ~i, i = 1,2) in Figure 2. The vertical
intercept for credit supply is instead api + 20jJpi, which is the first partial of Cpi evaluated
at iiPi = "ifpi = 10 (i.e., where qpi equals zero), i = 1,2.
Initial values for each parameter in the model are presented in Table 1. Note that
these values distinguish polluter p2 as being high-cost (in terms of marginal abatement
cost) relative to polluter pl. Polluter p2 is also high-cost relative to the dominant firm and
the competitive fringe. However, the slope ofpolluterpl's marginal cost curve (2jJp] =
0.5) is less than the corresponding slope of the competitive fringe's aggregate marginal
cost (2/ t:J = 2), while its vertical intercept (ap ] =0.015) is slightly larger (a! = 0.01).
Both the competitive fringe and polluter pl are high-cost relative to the dominant firm .
These relative costs reflect the underlying maintained assumptions of the competitive
fringe model, in particular that the dominant firm generally faces lower sequestration
costs than the competitive fringe and the polluters, and the competitive fringe in turn
faces lower cost than at least some of the polluters. 13
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Since the demand curve facing the dominant firm has a total of three kink points
(including the vertical intercept), one each corresponding to the vertical intercepts of the

13 In order to focus attention on the role of divergent abatement cost structures, we assume equivalent
required abatement levels for the polluters, i.e., qpI = qp2 = 10.

12

marginal sequestration/abatement-credit cost curves for the competitive fringe, a;; and the
two polluters, api + 20/Jpi, i = 1,2, we run three separate constrained versions of the
model: (i) p * ~ a;; (ii) af < p * ~ ap] + 20/Jp], and (iii) ap] + 20/Jp] < P * < ap2 + 20/Jp2,
(reference the residual demand curve If in Figure 2). The version of the model
associated with the highest profit for the dominant firm then represents the equilibrium
solution. In the case of this particular numerical analysis, model version (iii) is
associated with the dominant firm's highest profit level. This is the region of residual
demand where the carbon price is least restricted on the upside.
To assess the responsiveness of sequestration and abatement to changes in the relative
cost structures of the three agents/industries, we introduce step increases (up to 10
separate steps) in the slope parameters of the two polluters, /Jp] and /Jp2, and step
decreases (of the same magnitude) in the elasticity parameter of the competitive fringe, Cf.
The step increases(decreases),,u, are each of the same magnitude, ,ll=0.l (-O.l) Thus, for
example, in the first step cfdecreases from one to 0.9, /Jp] increases from 0.25 to 0.35, and

/Jp2 increases from two to 2.1. In the second step qdecreases from 0.9 to 0.8, /Jp]
increases from 0.35 to 0.45, and /Jp2 increases from 2.1 to 2.2, and so on. These steps lead
to progressively less separation in costs between the competitive fringe and the polluters,
as well as between polluters pJ and p2 themselves. In particular, polluter p2 becomes
proportionately less high-cost relative to polluter pJ, and both polluters become
proportionately less high-cost relative to the competitive fringe. The competitive fringe
and the polluters in tum become progressively more high-cost relative to the dominant
firm (in terms of the rate of change in marginal sequestration cost).

13

4. Numerical Results
Table 2 presents our numerical results based on the initial parameter values

containe~

in

Table 1. The second column in the table presents the benchmark equilibrium for the case
of perfect competition, where the dominant firm does not exist and the market is
therefore supplied solely by the competitive fringe (and any abatement credits
contributed by the two polluters). 14 The table's third column presents results for the
competitive fringe model (i.e., with the dominant firm included).
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
We begin by noting that at these initial parameter values the competitive fringe
produces slightly less sequestration in aggregate than the dominant firm,
i.e., q; = 3.441> q; = 3.014. At the equilibrium price p* = 6.039, polluter pJ supplies a
positive amount of abatement credits (q;l

= 2.048), while polluterp2 demands the sum

of these credits and the sequestration produced by the dominant firm and competitive
fringe, i.e., Qp2

-ii p2 = Q* = 8.503:::::> q;2 = -8.503.

As expected, in relation to the competitive benchmark equilibrium the competitive
fringe's supply of sequestration, as well as both polluters' abatement efforts, all decrease
in response to the presence of a dominant firm. The equilibrium carbon price also
decreases, due to the combination of the dominant firm's lower costs of sequestration and
the restriction of the market demand curve (see Figure 2). The decrease in the

14 The conception of perfect competition in the competitive fringe model is markedly different than in a
monopoly model. In a monopoly model, the monopolist's marginal cost curve corresponds to (or is
subsumed by) the industry's marginal cost under perfect competition. As a result of this difference, the
equilibrium carbon price in the competitive fringe model can be higher than in the perfect competition
model.
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(endogenized) licensing fee for the competitive fringe,

F:*, indicates that the equilibrium

number of fringe firms decreases in the presence of a dominant firm.
Figures 3 and 4 show how the initial equilibrium in the competitive fringe model,
changes as the parameter values /Jp], /Jp2, Gfare changed. As described in Section 3, these
changes lead to progressively less separation in costs between the competitive fringe and
the polluters, as well as between polluters pi and p2 themselves. Polluter p2 becomes
proportionately less high-cost relative to polluter pi, and both polluters become
proportionately less high-cost relative to the competitive fringe. The competitive fringe
and the polluters in turn become progressively more high-cost relative to the dominant
firm.
[INSERT FIGURES 3 AND 4 HERE]
In Figure 3 we see that these changes result in both the competitive fringe and lowcost polluter pi losing market share to the dominant firm. The competitive fringe loses
market share at an increasing rate up to the sixth step increase in its marginal cost, at
which point its sequestration supply begins an asymptotic decent toward zero. Polluter
pi loses market share at a decreasing rate throughout and becomes a net buyer of

sequestration at the fourth step increase in its marginal abatement cost. These two trends
position the dominant firm as the sole supplier of sequestration (to both polluters) by the
10th step increase.
Concomitant with these changes in relative market shares, Figure 4 shows that the
dominant firm's profit increases exponentially with the step increases. The carbon price
rises along with the dominant firm's market share and profit (and the gradual
disappearance of the competitive fringe). Interestingly, the (implied) number of fringe
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firms rises gradually over the first 5 step increases (approximately the same number of
steps during which the fringe's (aggregate) market share declines at an increasing rate).
The number of firms then falls for the next two periods, rises again for the following
period, and then falls steeply toward zero by the final step. At that point the fringe has
completely disappeared.

5. Summary and Discussion
This paper makes two contribution's to the carbon-sequestration literature; a literature
which has heretofore been focused on the empirical estimation of sequestration supply
functions, both for specific countries and globally. The first contribution is to develop a
theoretical framework within which sequestration and permit trading may be analyzed
jointly in the context of a competitive fringe model. An empirically based motivation for
developing this framework is provided by Benitez, et al. (2007), who find that low-cost
sequestration sites are mainly located in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, southeastern
Brazil, and Southeast Asia. This suggests that the equilibrium emerging in a regional or
global sequestration market may be governed more by the interplay of a dominant firm
(e.g., public land owned by a specific region or nation) and a competitive fringe (e.g.,
private land owned by u.S. farmers) than by perfect competition within a given nation (as
assumed by Stavins (1999) and Lubowski, et al. (2006)).
The second contribution is to numerically analyze the competitive fringe/permittrading model. We find that when the cost-structure changes lead to progressively less
separation in costs between the competitive fringe and the polluters (as well as between
the polluters themselves), and the dominant firm becomes progressively more low-cost
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relative to the competitive fringe and the polluters, the equilibrium allocations of
sequestration and abatement align with a higher carbon price. Aggregate output from the
competitive fringe decreases smoothly and asymptotically toward zero. However, th~
(implied) number of fringe firms fluctuates up and down, eventually reaching zero itself.
These results demonstrate the responsiveness of sequestration and abatement allocations
to changes in the relative cost structures of the dominant firm, the competitive fringe, and
the polluters engaged in permit trading.
Of course numerical analysis based on ad hoc parameter values and functional forms
is limited by its inability to inform policy with anything other than a more qualitative
assessment of-equilibrium allocations in a relative sense, e.g., by answering questions
such as how 'smooth' might be the disappearance of a competitive fringe as the dominant
firm becomes more cost-effective in its production of sequestration, or vice-versa? Until
the parameter values and functional forms themselves are empirically estimated and
incorporated into the numerical analysis, the numerical model will be limited in its policy
relevance.
However, this type of criticism also runs in the opposite direction. Until empirical
analyses such as Stavins (1999), Lubowski, et al. (2006), and Benitez, et al. (2007)
account for both the global nature of the carbon sequestration problem and the
corresponding market structures that are most likely to govern the behavior of the various
agents involved, estimates of what are inherently endogenous variables (e.g., the
allocation of sequestration and abatement and the carbon price) will be biased estimates
of the equilibrium outcomes themselves. Thus, the avenue for future research seems
clear.
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Demand-side information must be incorporated into supply-side models; information
that is global in scale (or regional if carbon emissions are to be controlled via a set of
region-based agreements a la Asheim, et aI., 2006) and reflective of underlying mark~t
structure. Incorporation of this type of information into national supply-side models, such
as those of Lubowski, et al. (2006) and Stavins (1999), will extend supply estimates from
reflecting what is possible under the parochial assumptions of perfect competition to what
is a likely in the wider realm of a global equilibrium. The same can be said for global
supply-side models, such as Benitez, et al.'s (2007). With respect to the role that market
structure might play in the allocation of sequestration and abatement on a global or
regional scale; echoes can be heard of Hahn's (1984) seminal article demonstrating the
importance of market power in detennining an equilibrium outcome.
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Figure 1. Standard Competitive Fringe Model.
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Figure 2. Competitive Fringe Model with Permit Trading.
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Figure 3. Quantities of Sequestration and Abatement Credits.
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Figure 4. Carbon Price, Dominant Firm Profit, and Implicit Number of Fringe Firms.
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9

10

Table 1. Initial Parameter Values for Numerical Analysis.
Parameter

Initial Value

ad

0.009

af

0.01

apJ

0.015

ap2

0.05

/JpJ

0.25

/Jp2

2.0

cd

1.2

cf

1

v

1.05

qpl

10

qp2

10
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Table 2. Equilibrium Solutions Based on Initial Parameter Values.
Variable

Perfect Competition

*

Competitive Fringe
3.441

qd

qf

*

3.640

3.014

qpl

*

4.550

2.048

qp2

*

-8.190

-8.503

Q*

8.190

8.503

p

7.290

6.039

*

2.985

7rd

F*s

13.250
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9.087

